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What is Sacred?
Scientists sometimes cannot explain their observations about the known universe except by assuming the existence of something not yet discovered-another planet or star or force. So they assume that something else does exist, and they look for it. Astronomers discovered the planet Neptune, for example, only alter they realized that the movements of the planet Uranus could be explained only by the gravitational force of another celestial body, yet unknown, orbiting the sun still farther out.
I have been arguing that most of us-liberals as well as conservatives-cannot explain our convictions in the way that many politicians, self-appointed spokesmen, moralists, and philosophers think we can. They say that the different opinions we have about when and why abortion is morally wrong, and about how the law should regulate abortion, all follow from some foundational conviction each of us has about whether a foetus is a person with rights or interests of its own, and, if so, how far these tramp the rights and interests of a pregnant woman. But when we look closely at the kinds of convictions most people have, we find that we cannot explain these simply by discovering people's views about whether a human foetus is a person. Our convictions reflect another idea we also hold, whose gravitational force better explains the shape of our beliefs and our disagreements.
I have already said what that different idea is.
We believe that it is intrinsically regrettable when human life, once begun, ends prematurely. We believe, in other words, that a premature death is bad in itself, even when it is not bad for any particular person. Many people believe this about suicide and euthanasia-that a terrible thing has happened when someone takes his own life or when his doctor kilts him at his own request even when death may be in that person's own best interests. We believe the same about abortion: that it is sometimes wrong not because it violates a foetus's rights or harms its interests, but in spire of a foetus's having no rights or interests to violate. The great majority of people who have strong views about abortion-liberal as well as conservative believe, at least intuitively, that the life of a human organism has intrinsic value in any form it takes, even in the extremely undeveloped form of a very early, just-implanted embryo. I say "at least intuitively" because many people Rave not related their views about abortion or euthanasia to the idea that human life has intrinsic value. For them, that idea is the undiscovered planet that explains otherwise inexplicable convictions.
The idea of life's intrinsic value may seem mysterious, and 1 must try to make it seem less so. I shall have to overcome, first, an objection that philosophers have raised, which denies the very possibility that anything has intrinsic value. David Hume and many other philosophers insisted that objects or events can be valuable only when and because they serve someone's or something's interests. On this view, nothing is valuable unless someone wants it or unless it helps someone to get what he does want. How can it be important that a life continue unless that life is important for or to someone?
How can a life's continuing be, as 1 am suggesting, simply important in and of itself?
That may seem a powerful objection. But much 2 Life's Dominion of our life is based on the idea that objects or events can be valuable in themselves. It is true that in ordinary, dayto-day life people do spend most of their rime trying to get or make things they value because they or someone else enjoys or needs them. They try to make money and buy cloches or food or medicine for that reason. But the idea that some events or objects are valuable in and of themselves-that we honor them not because they serve our desires or interests but for their own sakes-is also a familiar part of our experience. Mach of what we think about knowledge, experience, art, and nature, for example, presupposes that in different ways these are valuable in themselves and not just for their utility or for the pleasure or satisfaction they bring us. The idea of intrinsic value is commonplace, and it has a central place in our shared scheme of values and opinions.
It is not enough, however, simply to say that the idea of intrinsic value is familiar. For we are concerned with a special application of that idea-the life claim that human life even in its most undeveloped form has intrinsic value and that application raises unique puzzles.
Why does it not follow, for example, that there should be as much human life as possible? Most of us certainly do not believe that. On the contrary, it would be better, at least in many parts of the world, if there were less human life rather than more. Then how can it be intrinsically important that human life, once begun, continue? Those are important questions, and in answering them we will discover a crucial distinction between two categories of intrinsically valuable things: those that are incrementally valuable the more of them we have the better-and those that are not but are valuable in a very different way. 1 shall call the latter sacred or inviolable values.
There is another, quite independent puzzle. I claim not only that most of us believe that human life has intrinsic value, but also that this explains why we disagree so profoundly about abortion. How can that be? Is that a peculiar distinction? No: we make the same distinction about other objects or events that we think are intrinsically valuable. We treat much of the art we value as sacredly rather than incrementally valuable.
We attach great value to works of art once they exist, even though we care less about whether more of them are produced. Of course we may believe that the continual production of great art is tremendously important-that the more truly wonderful objects a culture produces the The second way something may become sacred is through its history, how it came to be. In the case of art, for example, inviolability is not associational but genetic: it is not what a painting symbolizes or is associated with but how it came to be that makes it valuable. We protect even a painting we do not much like, just as we try to preserve cultures we do not especially admire, because they embody processes of human creation we consider important and admirable.
We take a parallel attitude, we must now notice, toward aspects of the natural world: in our culture, we tend to treat distinct animal species (though not individual animals) as sacred. We think it very important, and worth considerable economic expense, to protect endangered species from destruction at human hands or by a human enterprise -a market in rhinoceros tusks, valued for their supposed aphrodisiac power; dams that threaten the only habitat of a certain species of fish; or timbering practices that will destroy the lest horned owls. We are upset-it would be terrible if the rhinoceros ceased to exist-and we are indignant: surely it is wrong to allow such a catastrophe just so that human beings can make more money or increase their power.
Why are individual species so valuable that it would ' be dreadful if some useful enterprise destroyed one or a few of the many thousands of species in the world? Someone might Say: we protect endangered species because we want the pleasure of continuing to see animals of each species, or because we want the useful information we might gain by studying them, or because it is more interesting for us that there be more rather than fewer species. But none of these arguments rings true. Many-perhaps most---of the people who consider endangered species important are very unlikely even to encounter any of the animals they want to protect. I doubt that many who have labored to protect the horned owl have any plans to visit the habitat of those birds or to look them up in zoos, nor do I think they believe that in keeping horned owls alive we will learn enough useful information to justify the expense. These people struggle to protect the species simply because they think it would be a shame if human acts and decisions caused it to disappear. So this is another important example of something many of us take to be of intrinsic rather than instrumental value. It is also an example of sacred rather than incremental value: few people believe the world would be worse if there had always been fewer species of birds, and few would think it important to engineer new bird species if that were possible. What we believe important is not that there be any particular number of species but that a species that now exists not 6 Life's Dominion be extinguished by us. We consider it a kind of cosmic shame when a species that nature has developed ceases, through human actions, to exist.
I put the point that way-about not destroying
what nature has created-to emphasize the similariry I claim between our révérence for art and our concern for the survival of species. Both art and species are examples of things inviolable to us not by association but in virtue of their history, of how they came to exist. We see the evolutionary process through which species were developed as itself contributing, in some way, to the shame of what we do when we cause their extinction now.
Indeed, people who are concerned to protect threatened species often stress the connection between art and nature themselves by describing the evolution of species as a process of creation.
For most Americans, and for many people in other countries, the evolutionary process is quite literally creative, for they believe that God is the author of nature.
On that assumption, causing a species to disappear, wholly to be lost, is destroying a creative design of the most exalted artist of all. But even people who do not cake that view, but who instead accept the Darwinian thesis that the evolution of species is a matter of accidental mutation rather than divine design, nevertheless often use artistic metaphors of creation. They describe discrete animal species as not just accidents but as achievements of adaptation, as something that nature has not just produced but wrought. The literature of conservation is studded with such personifications of nature as creative artist. They are part of the fertile ground of ideas and associations in which the roofs of conservationist concern are buried. Indeed, so thoroughly have the metaphors of artistic and cultural creation come to dominate pleas for the preservation of species that the analogy is now used in reverse. An anthropologist recently pleaded that we should treat the threatened death of a primitive language with as much concern and sympathy as we show mail darters and horned owls and other near extinct species of animal life.
Our concern for the preservation of animal species reaches ifs most dramatic and intense form, of course, in the case of one particular species: our own. It is an inarticulate, unchallenged, almost unnoticed, but nevertheless absolute premise of our political and economic planning that the human race must survive and prosper. This unspoken assumption unites the two different examples of sanctity we have so far identified.
Our special concern for art and culture reflects the respect in which we hold artistic creation, and our special concern for the survival of animal species reflects a parallel respect for what nature, understood either as divine or as secular, has produced. These twin bases of the sacred come together in the case of the survival of our own species, because we treat it as crucially important that we survive not only biologically but culturally, that our species not only lives but thrives. That is the premise of a good part of our concern about conservation and about the survival and health of cultural and artistic traditions. We are concerned not only about ourselves and others now alive, but about untold generations of people in centuries to come.
We cannot explain our concern about future humanity, of course, as concern for the rights and interests of particular people. Suppose that through great stupidity we were to unleash radioactivity whose consequences was that human beings were extinct by the twenty-second century. It is absurd to argue that we would then have dope terrible injury or injustice to people who would otherwise have lived, unless we think that in some very crowded mystical space people are waiting to be conceived and born. We sometimes talk that way, and may even fall into ways of thinking that would make sense only if there were such mystical worlds of possible Life's Dominion 7 people with a right to exist. But in fast our worries about humanity in centuries to come make sense only if we suppose that it is intrinsically important that the human race continue even though it is not important to the interests of particular people.
We also consider it important that people live well, and we therefore think we have a responsibility not only not to destroy the possibility of future generations but also to leave them a fair share of natural and cultural resources. That is the presupposition of what philosopher call the problem of justice between generations: the idea that each generation of people must in fairness leave the world fit for habitation not only by their children and grandchildren, whom they already know and love, but for generations of descendants whose identity is in no way yet fixed, at least in ways we can understand, but depends on what we must consider billions of independent accidents of genetic coupling. Philosophers speak of this as a matter of justice, and so do politicians and columnists: they argue, for example, that the huge national debt that the government has allowed the United States to develop in recent decades is unfair to generations yet unborn. But that way of putting it is misleading, because our concern for the future is not concern for the rights or interests of specific people. The decisions we now make about conservation and the economy will affect, in ways we cannot understand, let alone anticipate, not only what resources our descendants will have but which people they will be. It hardly makes sense to say that we owe it to some particular individual not selfishly to squander the earth's resources if that individual will exist only if we do squander them. Or, for that matter, only if we don't. Our concern for future generations is not a matter of justice at all but of our instinctive sense that human flourishing as well as human survival is of sacred importance. it does not follow that it is intrinsically more important, and once that distinction is made, it is ludicrous to suppose that even a premature and tragic death, let alone a natural death after a long life, is intrinsically a worse event than the destruction of all human art and knowledge would be. But Popper-Lynkeus's claim does capture, in hyperbolic form, a conviction that must now be our main concern: that in some circumstances the deliberate ending of a single human life is intrinsically bad--objectively a shame-in the same way as the destruction of great art or the loss of important knowledge would be.
We are now in a better position to appreciate that conviction. I said that we treat the preservation and prosperity of our own species as of capital importance because we believe that we are the highest achievements of God's creation, if we are conventionally religious, or of evolution, if we are not, and also because we know that all knowledge and art and culture Meanwhile, at the foot of the bed, in Lizaveta Petrovna's skillful hands flickered the life of a human being, like the small uncertain flame of a night-light-a human being who had not existed a moment ago but who, with the same rights and importance to itself as the rest of humanity, would live and create others in its own image.... Whence, wherefore had it come, and who was it? He could not understand at all, nor accustom himself to the idea. It seemed to him too much, a superabundance, to which he was unable to get used for a long time.
The natural miracle that so moved Levin begins much earlier than birth: it begins in the genetic identity of an embryo. The second form of sacred creation, the human as distinct from the natural investment, is also Decisions about abortion often raise this question. Suppose parents discover, early in the mother's pregnancy, that the fetus is genetically so deformed that the life it would lead after birth will inevitably be both short and sharply limited. They must decide whether it is a worse frustration of life if the gravely deformed fetus were to die at once wasting the miracle of its creation and its development so far-or if it were to continue to grow in utero, to be born, and to live only a short and crippled life. We know that people divide about that question, and we now have a way to describe the division. On one view, immediate death of the fetus, even in a case like this one, is a more terrible frustration of the miracle of life than even a sharply diminished and brief infant life would be, for the latter would at least redeem some small part, however 
